Chinese Foreign Policy & National Security Essay

The chinaware- sec Korea axis of rotation vertebra is perhaps the most overlooked variable in the strategicalalal surround of northboundeast Asia. For nearly five decades their relationship was characterized by war, wishing of dialogue and non-recognition then, over a period of some three years, this blot gave away to fully normalized and amiable relations in 1992. Rapprochement betwixt Seoul and capital of Red chinaware in 1992 opened star of the first frontiers of the post-Cold warfare thaw in the neighbourhood, and prox tribute will hinge at least dowerly on this core relationship. In this context, Cha analyzes the evolution of Sino- atomic number 16 Korean reconciliation, and argues that the sulphur Koreas struggle indemnity from the recent 1980s in the political, frugal, and cultural arenas played a study part in eliciting unexampled cooperation from Beijing, however, its initiatives alone were not a sufficient condition to prompt this cooperation.A prior and necessary condition was a intensify in the strategic context surrounding mainland chinaware and the Korean Peninsula that raised both(prenominal) the benefits of cooperation and the be of non-cooperation the depot of Cold War . In the context of security environment in northwardeast Asia, atomic number 16 Koreas success in piquant china has implications for future security on the Korean Peninsula. On balance, the axis is a stabilizing factor scarcely not without its share of future challenges. With this in mind, the key questions of the article include (1) How does one explain the harvest-home of cooperation between China and mho Korea? (2) To what extent has Sino-ROK rapprochement been the result of undefeated strategies on the part of southernmost Korea to engage China? (3) What are the implications on North Korea?For a quarter-century after the Korean War, Sino-South Korean relations sit down at the intersection of the global East-West conflict and the Sino-Sovi et split, making any tinge of cooperation impossible.1 However, since the middle 1980s, Sino-South Korean relationship has moved from world sworn enemies and foreign combatants in the Korean War, to being potency economic partners (but lock away strategic adversaries), and fully normalized diplomatical relations in 1992. Three key drivers propelled the change in the relationship (1) the transformation of strategic environment concomitant to the end of Cold War, which established the baseline for post-war interaction.In this context, Sino-Soviet reconciliation was a material factor in Chinese calculations to normalize with Seoul. In particular, the end of Sino-Soviet controversy reduced in Chinese minds the strategic consequences of losing North Korea to Moscow, and made commencement to South Korea more feasible. Furthermore, in South Koreas view, China had evolved from being a revisionist king to being a status quo one, in the percentage point to which Beijing emphasized u nification or peace nourishment as the security priority for the Peninsula. Unification was associated with Chinas revolutionary power and support for North Korea to overthrow the South the essence of Chinas one Korea indemnity of the Cold War. On the other hand, peace maintenance implied constancy outcome for Korea by recognizing South Korea and debate provocative acts by the North which might upset the unstable peace on the Peninsula.(2) home(prenominal) change in China concomitant to Deng Xiaopings modernization reforms, and ulterior separation of politics from economics. The initial economic trade was largely substantiative, transacted by means of third-party intermediaries or South Korean trading firms in Hong Kong. By 1985, however, broad(a) Chinese-South Korea trade surpassed that between China and North Korea. During the 1980s, while the two sides fluent viewed one some other as military adversaries, they increasingly recognized distributively other as economic opportunities. The beginnings of a diplomatic relationship alike emerged in the 1990s with the establishment of trade offices between the Korea Trade progress Association (KOTRA) and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1990, which facilitated shift from indirect trade to open and direct transactions, and subsequently in establishing formal diplomatic relations in August 1992.(3) South Koreas conscious policy of intimacy to elicit cooperation from China, in particular using non-punitive, non-coercive diplomacy and quest mutual accommodation. South Koreas engagement strategy contained the spare-time activity tiers first, economic linkages, investment and trade ties to increase the benefits to China of cooperation, and the costs of non-cooperation, providing foreign roof and technology, separating political cooperation with economics, but gradually produce cooperative behavior in other arenas.The growth of trade ties in the 1980s was a major reason why China chose to participate in the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics hosted by South Korea, which served as key as yett to normalize relations. Second principle of South Koreas engagement strategy was to treat the opposing secernates perspectives as legitimate per se. This meant savoury Chinas diverging typeset into official dialogues on the proposals for enhancing peace and stability in the region such as the Four-Party talks, and more all important(p)ly South Koreas recognition of One China Policy, acknowledging Beijing as the only court-ordered government in China. These initiatives at the diplomatic front were followed by frequent increase in communication flows on the business, educational, and cultural levels to mould goodwill.In this context, South Koreas engagement strategy included the following goals (1) cultivate Beijings cooperation by tying Chinese national interests to stability on the Peninsula (2) improve South Koreas credibility in the world-wide arena by enhancing its image as a regional impostor willing to reduce tensions and foster dialogue and (3) engage North Korea through and through alternative channels. In order to pursue these goals, South Korea utilized the following means in the macro-political perspective, the strategy of engagement of China was pursued through the policy of Nordpolitik and Globalization (segyehwa) which implied mutual economic prosperity as a means of expanding diplomatic ties with former adversaries as well as presume a leading role for South Korea in international organizations and the continue expansion of program multi-directional diplomacy (i.e. using meetings of palmately-lobed bodies such as APEC, ASEAN, non-governmental track-two diplomacy, high-level military exchanges). The second method of engagement has been sports diplomacy fighting(a) in athletic competitions hosted by each country provided a useful means by to express good will and interest in expanding the economic cooperation (Seoul 1988 Olympics, Beijin g Asian Games 1990).What was the benchmark of success of South Koreas engagement strategy? The key was not only engaging China, but also the terms of policy toward North Korea. The following measure could be used(A) Failure Chinese support of North Korea(B) Minimal advantage 1.5 Korea policy formal support of North Korea and de-facto recognition of South Korea(C) enclose Success equidistance between North and South Korea(D) Very Successful discourage North Korean provocation and aggression(E) Most Successful China supports only South KoreaCha argues that the outcome of South Koreas engagement locomote in the middle range (B to D). For example, Chinese behavior on the North Korean nuclear issue in 1993-94, when Beijing sided with the US and South Korea on many aspects (such as opposing North Korea to renege atomic Non-Proliferation agreement (NPT) and abide to non-nuclear Peninsula), however, at the same time Beijing express strong opposition against any acts of coercion a gainst the North. It persistently pressed for dialogue and negotiona as the only acceptable means of settling the dispute, and impertinent any U.S. led sanctions thought the UN Security Council. A more prospering outcome was the redefined Chinese behavior on UN admission of the two Koreas in 1991, in which Chinese accepted dual membership of the two Koreas in the UN.Arguing that South Korean engagement of China has been sustained, comprehensive and sanely successful, the next question is how this new relationship will chance on security on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the broader region? Salient issues include the intrusion of the Asian financial crisis, the dynamics of second U.S.-North Korea nuclear crisis, the effect of Bejing-Seoul dtente on South Koreas alliance with Washington, and the future challenges that could be represent by Korean unification.(1) The impact of the Asian Financial Crisis didnt affect China-South Korean relations thus far. In-fact, in 2003 Chi na has surpassed the U.S. as South Koreas largest trading partner(2) Sino-South Korean relations charter important implications in understanding current relations between North and South Korea. Under Kim Dae Jung, South Korea initiated Sunshine Policy that rests on Seouls assurances of no-isolation, no destabilization, and no absorption. The Sunshine Policy is in many slipway similar to the engagement strategy toward China, both in form and potential success. In particular, it is consistent (despite Norths provocations) and designed to elicit cooperation from the opposing verbalize.However, in that location are also differences- regarding intentions for cooperation to emerge, the opposing state has to be engageable. North Koreas behavior does not suggest she is open to an improvement of relations. Second, there are differences in South Koreas capabilities of early 1990s and late 1990s, in particular, in the early 1990s South Korea that engaged China did so from a position of rel ative strength and prosperity however, in the late 1990s, the Asian financial crisis put South Korean position to a relative weakness., because conciliatory gestures are more likely to be interpreted as appeasement rather than engagement. Hence success to engagement of North Korea is not likely.(3) Looking beyond the immediate North Korean nuclear problem, Korean unification raises a plethora of new factors that would canvas the resilience of China-South Korea engagement. The absence of the North Korean buffer would give forward motion to a situation in which two powers with different regimes share a contiguous border. Another future challenges is on the economic front the insurrection China may hange its trade needs and increase competition with Korea. A final potential conflict between a united Korea and China centers on nationalism, and the two-million ethnic Korean living in Chinese Jilin province, which a unified Korea might claim.In the final analysis, the dramatic transfo rmation of Chin-South Korean relations in the 1990s represents the most successful case of engaging China in East Asia. The lessons stemming from this engagement include (1) consistency- a policy can only be successful if it is utilize consistently and deliberately, (2) engagement requires will and domestic political support to sustain the policy even in the face of little reciprocity by the other state (3) engagement applied from a position of strength conveys credibility, but applied from a position of weakness connotes appeasement. For the foreseeable future, the burden of managing the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula falls even more on the new China-South Korea dtente and the continuing U.S.-South Korea Alliance.My ObservationVictor Cha offers a plausible analysis of the South Koreas engagement strategy and the factors that have significantly improved Sino-South Korean relations, nonetheless, I would argue that he underestimated the historical factors that bind China and S outh Korea together, which might have accelerated the rapprochement on both sides. Traditionally, Korea has move under the Chinese sphere of influence, with Korea belonging to the first-tier state of the Sino-centered worldview. In this context, another traditional binding element is the continuing anti-Japanese sentiments and mistrust in both Koreas and China that target Japanese sense of irresponsibility and demand alibi for its war atrocities. Taken together, I would argue that these factors also facilitated the relatively rapid transformation of the relations, on a personal level between Korean and Chinese officials.In the context of enhancing peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, positive Sino-South Korean relations certainly play an important role. both states are aware of this factor, and share similar interests. However, Beijing seems to be in a dilemma, it desperately does not want to face a wreck of North Korea nor does it want to see a nuclear North Korea. Hence , Chinas actions in the foreign policy arena are still bound to the minimum necessary level to ensure stability. Ironically, while the Chinese officials have been claiming that they are making efforts to persuade North Korea to enter multilateral dialogue and negotiation, they also claim that North Korea doesnt listen as it used to. In this regard, my question is How much leverage does China have over North Korea? 1 From the ROK perspective, during the Cold War China was part of the communist bloc, a patron of revolutionary regimes in Asia, and thus one of the primary threats to South Koreas survival. Chinas intervention in the Korean War in 1950, in conjunction with the July 1961 Friendship Treaty between China and North Korea with its automatic intervention clause cemented South Koreas perceptions of China as a threat. At the same time, Chinas hostility toward South Korea was equally intense. South Korea was the fascist axis of the iron triangle that included U.S. imperialism, and Japanese militarism.